

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 SY-02 SCCT-01 L-01

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8987

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4741

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 6567

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, NATO

SUBJECT: TERRORISM: WORK OF THE NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE

REF: A. USNATO 6558 B. USNATO 6387 (NOTAL) C. STATE 247073  
(NOTAL)

SUMMARY: AT PERMREP LUNCH ON NOVEMBER 19, U.S. CHARGE MCAULIFFE DISCUSSED U.S. VIEWS OF THE CURRENT WORK OF THE NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, AND INFORMED PERMREPS OF THE U.S. DISAPPOINTMENT OVER EXCLUSION OF A U.S. DIPLOMAT FROM SPECIAL COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS ON GROUND THAT COMMITTEE WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ONLY IN THE PRESENCE OF SECURITY EXPERTS. SYG LUNS AND NUMBER OF PERMREPS WHO FOR MOST PART HAD NOT KNOWN OF THIS INCIDENT EXPRESSED SURPRISE AND STRONG DISAPPROVAL. LUNS UNDERTOOK TO CONDUCT INFORMAL INVESTIGATION. PERMREPS AGREED RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPRESENTATION OF ANY DELEGATION TO ANY CONFERENCE RESTS WITH INDIVIDUAL ALLIED GOVERNMENT AND SPECIAL COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN'S ACTION WAS IMPROPER. AT THE SAME TIME, PERMREPS AGREED COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE NO ACTION WHICH WOULD IMPAIR OR DESTROY MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BUILT UP OVER THE YEARS BY ALLIED SECURITY EXPERTS WHO WORK IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE. PERMREPS AGREED TO KEEP MATTER UNDER CONFIDENTIAL

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REVIEW AND TO AWAIT SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S REPORT ON TERRORISM DUE IN APRIL TO DETERMINE IF THAT COMMITTEE IS ABLE TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM IN A WAY THAT INCLUDES POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL ASPECTS. END SUMMARY.

1. AT WEEKLY INFORMAL LUNCHEON OF NATO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ON NOVEMBER 19, U. S. CHARGE MCAULIFFE NOTED THAT THE NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE HAD MET DURING NOVEMBER 4-6 AND HAD DISCUSSED TERRORISM AND VERY SPECIFICALLY THE ACTIVITIES OF THE JAPANESE RED ARMY. THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION FOUND ITSELF GRIEVOUSLY DISAPPOINTED ON THAT OCCASION WHEN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE SAID THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND SIMILAR MATERIAL ONLY WITH SECURITY EXPERTS, NOT WITH DIPLOMATS PRESENT. RESULT WAS THAT BARTCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXPERT ON TERRORISM, WHO HAD WAITED IN BRUSSELS FOR MORE THAN A WEEK SOLELY TO ATTEND THIS MEETING AND PARTICIPATE IN IT, WAS EXCLUDED FROM COMMITTEE'S FORMAL AND FINAL SESSION ON NOVEMBER 6. MCAULIFFE FELT PERMREPS SHOULD TAKE NOTE OF THE FACT THAT THE CHIEF U.S. REPRESENTATIVE AT THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE MEETING, MR. JAMES ADAMS, A DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WAS THE MOST SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL EVER TO HAVE ATTENDED A MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND THAT HE WAS QUITE PREPARED TO DISCUSS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE PRESENCE OF MR. BARTCH WHO POSSESSED ALL THE NECESSARY SECURITY CLEARANCES AND HAD A CLEAR RIGHT TO KNOW. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, MCAULIFFE SAID HE FOUND IT A MOCKERY THAT DIPLOMATS, WHO HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN THE TARGET OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES BY THE JAPANESE RED ARMY, SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM MEETINGS CONVENED TO DISCUSS THAT VERY TOPIC.

2. MCAULIFFE WENT ON TO SAY THAT POSITION OF FRANCE ON THIS ENTIRE ISSUE HAD BEEN CLEAR FROM THE START: AMBASSADOR DE ROSE HAD STATED WITH CLARITY THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE; AND THE UNITED STATES RESPECTED THAT POSITION. THE U.S. WAS DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO GENERAL DARE, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, WHO HAD SUPPORTED THE U.S. IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN ITS ENDEAVOR TO HAVE THIS ISSUE DEALT WITH. HOWEVER, THE U.S. DELEGATION WAS SURPRISED BY THE FACT THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OTHER ALLIES HAD NOT TAKEN A SIMILAR POSITION SINCE THE CONFIDENTIAL

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NATO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES SPEAKING INFORMALLY AT NUMEROUS PERMREPS LUNCHEONS HAD GIVEN THEIR FIRM SUPPORT TO THIS ENDEAVOR.

3. MCAULIFFE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT AS MATTERS NOW STOOD, VARIOUS ALLIES WOULD CONTRIBUTE BITS AND PIECES OF MATERIAL TO MR ABIDIAN, THE NATO DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, WHO WILL PREPARE A REPORT FOR SUBMISSION TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND EVENTUALLY, ONE HOPED, TO THE COUNCIL SOMETIME IN THE SPRING OF 1975. WE WOULD WAIT TO SEE WHAT THE RESULTS OF THAT REPORT WOULD BE. THE UNITED STATES HAD DERIVED BENEFIT FROM THE EARLIER 1973 MEETINGS ON TERRORISM IN WHICH AMBASSADOR ARMIN MEYER HAD PARTICIPATED, THE U.S. CHARGE SAID, AND WE BELIEVED THAT

OTHER ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAD DERIVED SIMILAR ADVANTAGE.  
WE HAD HOPED THAT THIS RECENT INITIATIVE BY THE UNITED STATES  
WHICH HAD BROUGHT AMBASSADOR LEWIS HOFFACER TO BRUSSELS  
LAST MONTH WOULD PROVIDE SIMILAR BENEFITS FOR ALL. THIS FIRST  
EFFORT HAD OBVIOUSLY FAILED; BUT WE PLANNED TO RENEW OUR  
EFFORTS IN THE SPRINGTIME.

4. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) DECLARED IT AN OUTRAGE THAT ANY  
CHAIRMAN SHOULD HAVE BANNED ANY PROPERLY ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVE  
OF AN ALLIED GOVERNMENT FROM ATTENDING A MEETING. HE DEMANDED  
THAT THE SYG EXPLAIN IT HIMSELF. LUNS SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD OF  
THE INCIDENT. HE ASKED DEPUTY SYG PANSA WHAT HAD HAPPENED.  
PANSA SAID HE KNEW ABSOLUTLY NOTHING. PANSA THEN EXPLAINED  
THAT, UNLIKE MOST OTHER NATO BODIES, THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF  
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ROTATES AMONG THE MEMBER STATES.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 6567

LIMDIS

5. KRAPF (FRG) SAID HE BELIEVED THAT HERR NOLLAU FROM BONN  
IS THE CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE. THE GERMAN PERMREP  
SAID HE HAD HEARD OF THE "UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT" BUT HAD NOT  
YET HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET TO THE BOTTOM OF IT. HE  
ADDED THAT NOLLAU'S RULING WAS BOTH IMPROPER AND DISCOURTEOUS,  
AND THE IDEA THAT ONLY SECURITY EXPERTS WERE AUTHORIZED  
TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM DID NOT CONFORM WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS  
THAT HE AS HEAD OF THE FRG DELEGATION TO NATO HAD RECEIVED  
FROM BONN. KRAPF SAID THE RGWELCOMEDOLLAATAND  
NSLTN WTHEASANTALT IET  
TOTTRTXTTTTL0TEEEEOTUTCHREPNTATTTTPAC  
OEILZFROOTHUOEAAARLY  
IFEVOTWTTETHERLANDS DELEGAO.SEVERALTHE  
AOAESADORHECURITHERTSDITTE SMENOOLY #  
TURNING TO THEI RTO DELEGATIONS FOR LOCAL  
TRANSPORTATION OR HOTEL RESERVATIONS.

7. DE STAERCKE SAID THIS WHOLE BUSINESS BORDEREED ON MADNESS. HE SAID THE SYG SHOULD DO MORE THAN SIMPLY PROVIDE STAFF SUPPORT AND WARM OFFICE SPACE, HE SHOULD MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER EVERY ACTIVITY WHICH TAKES PLACE UNDER THE NATO ROOF. THE BELGIAN PERMREP CONTINUED SAYING HE FOUND IT EQUALLY INCREDIBLE THAT AMBASSADORS OR THEIR DEPUTIES DID NOT KEEP IN CONTACT  
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WITH THOSE WHO COME TO NATO TO REPRESENT THEIR COUNTRY ON SPECIALIZED COMMITTEES AND WORKING GROUPS. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR STRICT SECRECY WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY PLANS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. DIPLOMATS DO NOT, AS A RULE, NEED TO KNOW ALL THE SPECIFIC TECHNICAL DETAILS IN THESE AREAS OF GREAT SPECIALIZATION AND SENSITIVITY; BUT EVERY AMBASSADOR AT NATO MUST INSURE THAT THE MILITARY, THE TECHNICIANS AND ALL THE EXPERTS COMPLY WITH POLICY DETERMINATIONS MADE BY THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.

8. MENZIES (CANADA) SECONDED THE DEAN. HE SAID THAT NEITHER THE SYG NOR THE COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD IMPAIR OR DESTROY THE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BUILT UP OVER THE YEARS BY THE ALLIED SECURITY EXPERTS SINCE IT ENABLED THEM TO WORK EFFECTIVELY BILATERALLY AND MULTILATERALLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, TERRORISM IS A REAL FACTOR IN POLITICAL LIFE IN 1974, AND IT IS LIKELY TO REMAIN SO. IT IS A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH ENGAGES THE ATTENTION OF MINISTERS. AUTHORITIES IN OTTAWA ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS MATTER, FOR CANADA WILL SOON BE HOSTING OLYMPIC GAMES--AND CANADIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN WHAT HAPPENED IN MUNICH.

9. CANADA IS NOT CONCERNED SOLELY ABOUT THE JAPANESE RED ARMY OR TERRORIST ELEMENTS IN THE PLO. IT HAD HOPED THAT ALLIED SECURITY EXPERTS COULD IN DUE COURSE ADDRESS THE TERRORISM ISSUE IN POLICY TERMS. MENZIES SAID THAT IT WOULD PERHAPS BE BEST TO WAIT UNTIL APRIL FOR THE REPORT THAT MR. ABIDIAN WOULD PREPARE. THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE DOES ITS WORK WELL ON CONTENDING WITH COMMUNISM AND SUBVERSIVE FORCES OF THAT SORT. MENZIES CONCLUDED SAYING IF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE PROVES UNABLE TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM IN A WAY THAT INCLUDES POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL ASPECTS AND TO COMPOSE A REPORT THAT WILL BE USEFUL TO DECISION-MAKERS IN ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, THEN CANADA MIGHT PROPOSE THAT THE TASK BE ASSIGNED TO THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE WHICH COULD DRAW AS NECESSARY ON NATO AND ALLIED RESOURCES. MCAULIFFE EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH MENZIES, ADDING THAT AMBASSADOR HOFFACKER CHAIRS THE U.S. CABINET COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM DRAWING ON POLICE, SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

10. LUNS REQUESTED MCAULIFFE TO PREPARE A MEMORANDUM ON WHAT  
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HAD TRANSPIRED IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NOVEMBER 5. MCAULIFFE DECLINED TO DO SO, SAYING THE ALLIED SECURITY REPRESENTATIVES GOT ON WELL WITH EACH OTHER--AND NO ONE WANTED TO DAMAGE THAT HAPPY RELATIONSHIP. THERE HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN A MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH HAD OCCURRED BECAUSE SOME DID NOT KNOW WHAT THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS WANTED. THERE HAD BEEN A DELAY; THERE WAS NOW SOME PROGRESS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION; THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S REPORT IN THE SPRING. IT SEEMED BEST TO LET MATTERS REST IN THE INFORMAL ATMOSPHERE OF THE PERMREPS LUNCH. DE STAERCKE AGREED. MCAULIFFE

NOTE BY OC/T: SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 6567; #PARA. 6. AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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